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In this paper I examine single member, simple plurality elections with n ≥ 3 probabilistic
voters and show that the maximization of expected vote share and maximization of probability
of victory are “generically different” in a speciﬁc sense. More speciﬁcally, I ﬁrst describe ﬁnite
shyness (Anderson and Zame (2000)), a notion of genericity for inﬁnite dimensional spaces.
Using this notion, I show that, for any policy x∗ in the interior of the policy space and any
candidate j, the set of n-dimensional proﬁles of twice continuously differentiable probabilistic
voting functions for which x∗ simultaneously satisﬁes the ﬁrst and second order conditions for
maximization of j’s probability of victory and j’sexpected vote share at x∗ is ﬁnitely shy with
respect to the set of n-dimensional proﬁles of twice continuously differentiable probabilistic
voting functions for which x∗ satisﬁes the ﬁrst and second order conditions for maximization
of j’s expected vote share.1 Introduction
In this paper, I examine the question of equivalence of two different objective (or payoff)
functions that political candidates may seek to maximize in an election: expected vote share or
the probability of victory. I restrict attention to single winner, simple plurality elections with
probabilistic voters and inquire as to whether optimal candidate strategies and equilibrium
policy positions are different under these two objective functions. The main ﬁnding of this
paper is that expected vote share and probability of victory are “generically” different in the
sense that satisfaction of the ﬁrst and second order conditions for maximization of expected
vote share by an electoral platform generally does not imply satisfaction of the ﬁrst and second
order conditions for maximization of probability of victory.
The question of equivalence between different candidate objectives, ﬁrst seriously studied
in the 1970s (Aranson, Hinich, and Ordeshook, (1974), Hinich (1977), and Ledyard (1984)),
has been the subject of renewed interest recently (Duggan (2000) and Patty (2000), (2001)).
At issue is whether candidates who seek to maximize their vote share should adopt the same
strategies as candidates who seek to maximize the probability of winning the election. In this
paper I prove that the answer to this question for single member, simple plurality elections with
probabilistic voters is, in a precise sense, “almost always” no.
There are two types of equivalence that have interested scholars of electoral strategy, best
response and equilibrium equivalence. If the optimal strategies of the candidates are identical
under the two objective functions, regardless of their opponents’ policy choices, then the ob-
jective functions are said to exhibit best response equivalence. Equilibrium equivalence of two
objectives holds if the two objectives yield identical sets of Nash equilibria. This paper speaks
to both types of equivalence. More to the point, the paper illustrates that either type of equiv-
alence between vote-maximization and probability of victory maximization is nongeneric. In
other words, one can conﬁdently expect candidate behavior to differ under vote-maximization
and probability of victory maximization, regardless of whether the object of interest is individ-
ual incentives or equilibrium behavior.
The main point of this paper’s results is that the optimal strategies for expected-vote-
maximizing and probability-of-victory-maximizing candidates usually differ. This result is
of theoretical and substantive importance for a number of reasons: ﬁrst, there is no reason to
assume a priori that the predictions of models of electoral competition are invariant to which
of these two objectives motivate candidates’ choices of platforms. Secondly, a probability of
victory-maximizing candidate will not generally choose a platform in a manner such that the
expected behaviors of all voters are treated “equally”: the responsiveness of a voter’s behavior
is weighted by the probability of his or her vote being pivotal in the election when the candi-
date calculates the marginal beneﬁt of a deviation in platforms. Finally, a pre-election poll of
expected vote choices is a sufﬁcient statistic for expected vote share (so long as voters respond
to the poll truthfully) – these results indicate that there is no reason to assume without further
restrictions that such a poll also provides a sufﬁcient statistic for the candidates’ probabilities
of winning the election.
A review of the relevant literature is provided in Section 2. The model is deﬁned in Section
13. In Section 4 we present a notion of genericity for inﬁnite dimensional spaces, shyness, due
to Hunt, Sauer, and Yorke (1992), and recently generalized by Anderson and Zame (2000). In
Section 5 I present several lemmas and the main result of the paper: generically, a policy that
satisﬁes the ﬁrst and second order necessary conditions for maximization expected vote share
does not satisfy the ﬁrst and second order necessary conditions for maximization of probability
of victory. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Related Work
Aranson, Hinich, and Ordeshook (1974) offer an equivalence result which rests on assump-
tions regarding perturbations of the candidate’s objective functions, perhaps representing fore-
cast errors. Their result, however, requires that these forecast errors are unbiased and, more
importantly, that the errors are uncorrelated with the strategies chosen by the candidates. As
the authors point out, this assumption is untenable, since the value of the objective functions
(even after the errors are taken into account) must fall between zero and one. A second equiv-
alence result obtained by Aranson, et al. requires that the votes received in a two candidate
election be distributed according to a multivariate normal distribution. This obviously requires
that negative vote totals be a positive probability event. Aranson, et al. were unable to offer any
equivalence results between expected plurality and probability of victory based on assumptions
regarding the primitives of the model.
Hinich (1977) provides justiﬁcation for examining expected vote share in place of prob-
ability of victory which depends only on the Central Limit Theorem. Hinich’s equivalence
result states that the two objective functions converged in 2 candidate elections without absten-
tion. This ﬁnding was extended by Ledyard (1984) to include 2 candidate elections in which
abstention is allowed.
Patty (2001) examines expected vote share maximization, expected plurality maximization,
and maximization of probability of victory and provides counterexamples to Hinich’s and Led-
yard’s results as well as providing sufﬁcient conditions for best response equivalence in two
candidate elections without abstention. Duggan (2000) examines the question of local equi-
librium equivalence in two candidate elections without abstention. Restricting attention to a
voter behavior rationalizable by an additive utility bias model of random utility maximization,
Duggan proves that a strengthened version of local concavity of voter preferences at a policy
proﬁle is a sufﬁcient condition for local equilibrium equivalence between maximization of ex-
pected vote share and maximization of probability of victory. Patty (2000) provides a related
notion of local equilibrium equivalence and essentially extends Duggan’s ﬁndings to general
models of probabilistic voting as well as elections with more than two candidates.
To date, research on the question of equivalence has successfully provided several sufﬁcient
conditions for both best response and local equilibrium equivalence. The literature has been
relatively silent, however, on the question of necessary conditions. Indeed, it is the author’s
impression that most scholars consider the occurrence of best response equivalence to be a rare
event. This intuition has not yet been formalized in the literature. This paper attempts to offer
2a rigorous examination of this issue within models of probabilistic voting and single member,
simple plurality elections.
3 The Model
Let N denote a ﬁnite set of voters, with |N| = n ≥ 3, and J denote the set of candidates,
with the cardinality of J being denoted as usual by |J|. Each candidate j ∈ J simultaneously
chooses a point xj in some compact policy space X ⊂ RK, with K < ∞, possessing nonempty
interior. I denote a J-dimensional vector of policy proposals by x and the space of all such
vectors of policy proposals by Y = X|J|. The vector of all announced policies, other than the
policy announced by candidate j, is denoted by x−j, and the space of all such vectors by Y−j.
Each voter i chooses one candidate, denoted by ai ∈ J.1 The vector of all choices,
(a1,...,aN), is denoted by a. The space of all such vectors is denoted by A. Each candi-
date j possesses an objective function uj : A → R. For any a ∈ A and j ∈ J, I denote the vote
total of candidate j by vj(a) =
PN
i=1 1[ai = j] and let w(a) ∈ {j ∈ J|vj(a) ≥ maxl∈J vl(a)}
denote the winning candidate at s. In the case of a tie, the winner is assumed to be determined
by a fair lottery between all candidates j for which vj(a) = maxl∈J vl(a). I denote the set of
such candidates by W(a). Thus, I am restricting attention to single winner, simple plurality
rule systems with a fair tie-breaking rule.
This paper considers elections with probabilistic voters (see Coughlin (1992) for an ex-
plication and survey of the theory of probabilistic voting). Accordingly, each voter i ∈ N is
characterized by a twice continuously differentiable response function, pi : Y → ∆(J), where
∆(J) denotes the |J| − 1 dimensional simplex: the set of |J|-dimensional vectors π for which P
j∈J πj = 1 and πj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ J. I denote the probability an alternative j ∈ J receives
voter i’s vote, conditional on policy proposal vector x, by p
j
i(x). I denote the vector of all
voters’ response functions by p.
I assume that each pi(x) characterizes an independent multinomial random variable ai(x),
meaning that, given a policy proﬁle x ∈ Y , all voters’ votes are independent. This is stated
formally below.
Assumption 1 (Independence) Conditional on a vector of policy proposals, x ∈ Y , the set of
ai(x) are independent random variables, each distributed according to pi(x), respectively, for
all i ∈ N.
I now use the set of response functions, p, to deﬁne two candidate objective functions,
expected vote share and probability of victory. Given any proﬁle of policy proposals x ∈ Y ,
any vector of response functions p, and for any vector of vote choices a, we write Pr[a|p(x)] = Q
i∈N p
ai
i (x) to denote the probability that the vote vector a is realized.
Given opponents’ pure strategies x−j, an expected vote share maximizing candidate j ∈ J




















I deﬁne an electoral game as Γ = (J,N,X,p,u), where u is a J-dimensional vector of candi-
date objective functions such that uj ∈ {Vj,Rj} for each candidate j ∈ J.2
In words, best response equivalence holds whenever two objective functions prescribe an
identical optimal (pure) strategy regardless of the strategieschosen by the opponents.3 Such
equivalence is essentially a decision-theoretic concern, as the strategic effects of other players’
motivations are inconsequential to the player in question. A second, weaker, form of equiv-
alence is equilibrium equivalence. Equilibrium equivalence holds whenever the set of Nash
equilibria under two different objective functions are identical. It is straight-forward to show
that best response equivalence implies equilibrium equivalence, so that equilibrium equiva-
lence is a necessary condition for best response equivalence.4 This paper offers insight into
both of these questions in the case where each voter’s behavior is a twice continuously differ-
entiable function of the policy choices of the candidates by examining the satisfaction of the
necessary ﬁrst and second order conditions for maximization of the two objectives.
4 Shyness and Finite Shyness
Finiteshyness, asdeﬁnedbyAndersonandZame(2000), providesarigorousnotionofgeneric-
ityininﬁnite-dimensionalspaces.5 Itisintendedtobehaveinwayssimilartomeasure-theoretic
notions of genericity (i.e., a notion of “almost everywhere”) in ﬁnite dimensional spaces. The
space of interest in this paper is the space of twice continuously differentiable functions from
a compact set Y to the n-fold Cartesian product of |J| − 1 dimensional simplices, ∆(J)n.
This space is inﬁnite-dimensional, leading to our interest in the notion of ﬁnite shyness. I now
proceed to deﬁne this notion.
For any ﬁnite dimensional subspace V ⊂ X, let λV denote Lebesgue measure on V and,
analogously, write λRk for Lebesgue measure on Rk.6
2The candidates are not required to share the same objective: some may maximize expected vote while others
maximize probability of victory.
3Throughout this paper, attention is restricted to pure strategies by the candidates. A discussion of best re-
sponse equivalence in the space of mixed strategies is contained in Chapter 2 of Patty (2000).
4For a more detailed discussion of this, see Aranson, Hinich, and Ordeshook (1974), p. 144-145.
5Finite shyness is an extensions of the notion of shyness, as deﬁned by Hunt, Sauer, and Yorke (1992). Finite
shyness is a stronger version of shyness.
6As noted by Anderson and Zame (2000) (p.13, footnote 11), for any ﬁnite dimensional space V there exists
a continuous linear isomorphism T : V → Rk for some positive integer k. Given T, one can deﬁne λV (A) =
4Deﬁnition 1 Let Q be a topological vector space and let U be a convex subset of Q that
is completely metrizable in the relative topology induced by Q. A Borel subset E ⊂ U is
ﬁnitely shy in (or relative to) U if there is a ﬁnite-dimensional subspace V ⊂ Q such that
λV(U + a) > 0 for some a ∈ Q and λV(E + q) = 0 for every q ∈ Q. An arbitrary subset
F ⊂ Q is ﬁnitely shy in U if it is contained in a ﬁnitely shy Borel set. If E is ﬁnitely shy in U,
then U \ E is referred to as ﬁnitely prevalent.
A useful fact is that the ﬁnite union of ﬁnitely shy sets is itself ﬁnitely shy.
Before presenting the analysis and results I note that, throughout the paper, the ambient
topological vector space (i.e., the topological vector space Q in the above deﬁnitions) is taken
to be the space of twice continuously differentiable functions from Y to (R|J|)n, endowed
with the topology of C2 uniform convergence.7 This space, which is complete, separable, and
metrizable (Mas-Colell, (1985), p.50), is denoted by C2 throughout the paper. The space of
n-dimensional vectors of twice continuously differentiable response functions is denoted by
P(Y ), a closed subset of C2.
5 Analysis and Results
In this section it is ﬁrst shown that, for any policy proﬁle x∗ in the interior of Y and any
candidatej, thesetofn-dimensionalvectorsoftwicedifferentiableresponsefunctionsthatlead
tosimultaneoussatisfactionoftheﬁrstandsecondordernecessaryconditionsformaximization
of Vj and Rj at x∗ is shy in the set of n-dimensional vectors of twice differentiable response
functions that satisfy the ﬁrst and second order necessary conditions for maximization of Vj
at x∗. This then immediately implies (the much weaker result) that the set of n-dimensional
vectors of twice differentiable response functions that exhibit best response equivalence is shy
in the set of all n-dimensional vectors of twice differentiable response functions.8
The results are stated in what may appear to be a strange fashion. In particular, a proﬁle of
platforms is ﬁxed and the sets of response functions which exhibit equivalence at that point are
examined. This method is motivated by application; typically, the question of equivalence is
dealt with when a modeler seeks to verify that, for example, the equilibrium derived under one
objective function is also an equilibrium under the other objective. Thus, the results provided
here state that, supposing that x∗ ∈ Y satisﬁes the necessary conditions to be a best response
λRk(T(A)) for each Borel set A ⊂ V . While this derived measure depends on the choice of isomorphism T,
all measures derived in this way are mutually absolutely continuous, so that for two isomorphisms T and T0,
λRk(T(A)) = 0 ⇒ λRk(T0(A)) = 0 for any Borel set A ⊂ V . We are concerned only with sets of Lebesgue
measure zero, so any choice of isomorphism T is without loss of generality for the purposes of this paper.
7Denoting the ith derivative of a function f by fi, the topology of Cr uniform convergence is the topology









where ||x|| = (
P
s x2
s)1/2 denotes the usual Euclidean metric.
8I thank a referee for clarifying my thinking regarding, and the exposition of, this point.
5under V , it is “generally not the case” that x∗ also satisﬁes the necessary conditions to be a best
response under R.
5.1 Generic Failure of Equivalence
For any electoral game with differentiable response functions p, any candidate j ∈ J, and any








Deﬁne the pivot probability of voter i with respect to candidate l, given a policy proﬁle
















where D(i;j) ⊂ A denotes the set of vote vectors in which voter i is decisive (or pivotal)
for candidate j. That is, D(i;j) is the set of outcomes in which voter i’s vote for candidate j
either created a tie between j and some other candidate(s) or broke a tie between j and some
other candidate(s). The following result (proved in the appendix) uses the pivot probability to
express the ﬁrst derivative of a candidate’s probability of victory with respect to her own policy
choice.
Lemma 1 For any electoral game with differentiable response functions p, any candidate j ∈









For any point x∗ ∈ Int(Y ), deﬁne PV(x∗) ⊂ P(Y ) as the set of n-dimensional vectors of



















∗) is negative semideﬁnite (n.s.d),
where Dp
j
i(x∗) denotes the evaluation at x∗ of the ﬁrst derivative of voter i’s probability of
voting for candidate j with respect to candidate j’s policy announcement and where D2p
j
i(x∗)
denotes the evaluation at x∗ of the matrix of second partial derivatives of voter i’s probability
of voting for candidate j with respect to candidate j’s policy announcement. Similarly, let
6PR(x∗) denote the set of n-dimensional vectors of twice continuously differentiable response















∗) is negative semideﬁnite.
Finally, let PV,R(x∗) denote the intersection of PV(x∗) and PR(x∗).
Before continuing, it should be noted that, while the deﬁnition of the set takes x∗ as an
argument, this is appropriate for the purposes of this paper in two respects: ﬁrst, the main
result of the paper is that any pure strategy that satisﬁes the ﬁrst and second order conditions
for maximization of expected vote share maximization is extremely unlikely to also satisfy the
ﬁrst and second order conditions for maximization of probability of victory and, second, the
results do not use any special characteristics of x∗ other than the fact that it is in the interior of
Y .9
The main result in this section is that PV,R(x∗) is ﬁnitely shy in PV(x∗) for any x∗ ∈
Int(Y ). First, several lemmas are proved. The ﬁrst two lemmas jointly demonstrate that the









is ﬁnitely prevalent in the PV(x∗). This is demonstrated by showing (1) that the set of function
proﬁles in PV(x∗) in which pi(x∗) 6∈ Int(∆(J)) for some i ∈ N is ﬁnitely shy in PV(x∗),
which implies that the set of function proﬁles in PV(x∗) such that there exists a voter i and a





is ﬁnitely shy in PV(x∗), and (2) that the set of function proﬁles in PV(x∗) such that, for all





is ﬁnitely shy in PV(x∗).
Lemma 2 Choose any point x∗ ∈ Int(Y ) and deﬁne
B(x
∗) = {p ∈ PV(x




The set B(x∗) is ﬁnitely shy in PV(x∗).
9The analysis would be much more complicated if boundary policy proﬁles were considered. I conjecture that
the results stated here would still hold, however, so long as the policy space is convex, since any policy on the
boundary that maximizes an objective function must satisfy the ﬁrst and second order conditions relative to the
interior of the policy space.
7Proof: Note that all closed sets are completely metrizable in the relative topology induced
from the topology of C2 uniform convergence on P(Y ) (Aliprantis and Border (1994), p.73).
It can be shown that PV(x∗) is a closed and convex subset of P(Y ) and, hence, completely
metrizable in the topology of C2 uniform convergence on P(Y ). Similarly, it may be veriﬁed
that B(x∗) is closed and therefore a Borel subset in the topology of C2 uniform convergence.
Consider the following function, which is constant with respect to Y :
p(·|α) = (α,(1 − α)/(|J| − 1),...,(1 − α)/(|J| − 1)),
and let h(·|α) = (p(·|α),...,p(·|α)) denote a n-dimensional proﬁle of identical response func-
tions. Deﬁne H as the following one dimensional subspace of P(Y ): H = {h(·|α)|α ∈ R}.
Since 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 implies that h(·|α) ∈ PV(x∗), it follows that λH(PV(x∗)) > 0. We now show
that λH(B(x∗) + g) = 0 for any g ∈ C2. Consider any a,b ∈ R and s,t ∈ B(x∗) such that
s + g = h(·|a)
t + g = h(·|b).
It must be the case then Dh(·|a) = Ds + Dg and Dh(·|b) = Dt + Dg. Since Dh(x|a) =
Dh(x|b) = 0 for all x ∈ Y and any real numbers a and b, it follows that Ds(x) = −Dg(x) and
Dt(x) = −Dg(x) for all x ∈ Y , so that Ds = Dt. Therefore, if s
j
i(x∗) = 0 and t
j
i(x∗) = 0 for
some i ∈ N and j ∈ J, then it must be the case that h(·|a) = g(x∗) = h(·|b), which implies
that a = b.10
Fixing g ∈ C2, it follows that for each pair (i,k), with i ∈ N and k ∈ J, there is at most
one real number a and one function s ∈ B(x∗) such that sk
i(x∗) = 0 and s+g = h(·|a). There
are at most |J|n such pairs for any given g ∈ C2. In other words, for any g ∈ C2, (B + g) ∩ H
contains at most |J|n elements. Since the Lebesgue measure of any ﬁnite set is zero, we have
that λH(B + g) = 0, so that B is ﬁnitely shy relative to PV(x∗), as was to be shown.
Lemma 3 Choose any point x∗ ∈ Int(Y ) and deﬁne
Z(x
∗) = {p ∈ PV(x




The set Z(x∗) is ﬁnitely shy in PV(x∗).
Proof: It has already been shown that PV(x∗) is a completely metrizable convex subset of
P(Y ). To see that Z(x∗) is a Borel subset in the topology of C2 uniform convergence, note
that Z is closed.
Choose a function f : X → (0,1) such that f is twice continuously differentiable and, for




i(x∗) for j = 1, then a = g1




i(x∗) for j 6= 1, then
a = 1 − (|J| − 1)g1
i (x∗) = b.































with φ ∈ R.
The set H = {h(·|φ)|φ ∈ R} is a one-dimensional subspace of P(Y ). Consider any φ
in the open interval (0,1). By construction, p1(·|φ),p2(·|φ), and p3(·) are twice continuously
differentiable response functions. Furthermore, Vk(x) is constant for each candidate k ∈ J and
all policy proﬁles x ∈ Y .11 From these facts it follows that λH(PV(x∗)) > 0. It is now shown
that λH(Z(x∗) + g) = 0 for any g ∈ C2. Suppose that, for some g ∈ C2, (Z(x∗) + g) ∩ H
contains more than one element. Then it must be the case that there exist distinct scalars
a,b ∈ R and distinct vectors of response functions s,t ∈ Z(x∗) such that
s + g = h(·|a),
t + g = h(·|b).
This would imply that Ds(x) = Dh(x|a) − Dg(x) and Dt(x) = Dh(x|a) − Dg(x) for any










Where, since h(x∗|·) and g(x∗) are n×|J| matrices, the differentiation denoted by Dx1h(x∗|a),
Dx1h(x∗|b), and Dx1g(x∗) is performed component-wise in each case. Accordingly, this dif-









with Df(x∗) 6= 0. It follows then that Dh(x∗|a) = Dh(x∗|b) implies a = b, contradicting the
supposition that a and b are distinct. Therefore, since (Z(x∗) + g) ∩ H contains at most one
element, it must be the case that λH(Z(x∗) + g) = 0 for all g ∈ C2. Hence, Z(x∗) is ﬁnitely
shy relative to PV(x∗), as was to be shown.
11Speciﬁcally, Vk(x) = n/|J| for all candidates k and all policy proﬁles x.
9The next lemma establishes that a ﬁnitely prevalent subset of the n-dimensional proﬁles of
twice continuously response functions for which x∗ maximizes expected vote share is charac-
terized by all voters having different pivot probabilities for any given candidate in J.
Before proceeding to formally stating and proving the lemma, it is illustrative to describe
the logic of the proof. The ﬁrst recognition is that it is sufﬁcient to consider any pair of voters
(say, voters 1 and 2) and any candidate (say, candidate 1) and show that the set of proﬁles of
response functions that lead to equal pivot probabilities for those two voters for that candidate
is a ﬁnitely shy subset of P(x∗). The set of proﬁles of response functions such that, for any
candidate, the pivot probabilities for that candidate for more than one pair of voters are equal
is a subset of the set of response functions at which at least one pair of voters have equal pivot
probabilities for some candidate. Since the numbers of voters and candidates are each ﬁnite
and the union of ﬁnitely many ﬁnitely shy sets is itself ﬁnitely shy, this approach is sufﬁcient
to show that the result holds.
The second fact motivating the proof of the result is that the pivot probability for voter 1
(for example) is a function of all other voters’ behaviors at x∗ (i.e., p−1(x∗)) and not his or
her own behavior (i.e., p1(x∗)). In addition, this probability is a function only of the value
of all other voters’ response functions at x∗. This greatly simpliﬁes the problem in the sense
that one can deal only with constant response functions (or, in other words, one can identify
each response function with a unique vector in ∆(J)). Using these facts, the proof essentially
holds the response functions of voters 3,4,...,n constant (after translation by g ∈ C2) and





for some candidate j to a subspace with empty interior relative to ∆(J). If this is the case, then
the lemma follows.
Broadly speaking, the proof consists of four steps. The ﬁrst step, after constructing a sub-
space of constant response functions, is the expression of voter 1’s pivot probability for candi-
date 1 as a linear function of voter 2’s response function, holding the response functions of the
other n − 2 voters constant. The logic of this step is that, in most cases (in terms of the other
n−2 voters’ response functions), any perturbation of voter 2’s response function will result in
a different pivot probability for candidate 1. The second step of the proof is demonstrating that
this is indeed the case. The third step of the proof deals with situations in which perturbing
voter 2’s response function will not alter voter 1’s pivot probability. These cases are rare, but
important. This case is dealt with by considering voter 3 and perturbing his or her behavior.12
This step is slightly complicated by the fact that then the n−3 remaining voters’ behaviors are
held ﬁxed. If these n − 3 response functions match up in a very speciﬁc way (which can not
be ruled out), then we must go further, considering voters 4,5, and so on. The ﬁnal step of the
proof is showing that this process need include no more than the smallest strict majority of the
voters. At this point, it is impossible for the response functions of the other (n − 3)/2 voters13
12An example of such a situation with three voters and two candidates is when voter 3 votes for candidate 1
with probability 1/2 and candidate two with probability 1/2. In this case, voter 1’s pivot probability for either
candidate is 1/2, regardless of voter 2’s behavior. If voter 3’s behavior is perturbed slightly, then this is no longer
the case. I thank a referee for suggesting this example.
13Or, n/2 − 1 voters if n is even.
10to match up so that perturbing the (n+1)/2th voter’s14 response function does not affect voter
1’s pivot probability for candidate 1.
The proof, while complicated in some ways, has a fairly straightforward logic behind it.
Any voter’s pivot probability for a given candidate is simply a sum of the product of the other
voters’ response functions over a subset of the possible vote proﬁles (namely, the vote proﬁles
in which that voter’s vote for the candidate in question is decisive). Lemma 2 allows us to
consider only cases in which all of these response functions are in the strict interior of the
|J|−1dimensionalsimplex. Thisturnsouttoguaranteethatvaryingoneofthevoters’response
functions will generally change this sum of products. The complicated steps involve ensuring
that the special cases where this is not the case are nongeneric.
Lemma 4 For any point x∗ ∈ Int(Y ), the set
T(x
∗) = {p ∈ PV(x
∗) \ B(x







is ﬁnitely shy relative to PV(x∗).
Proof: It has been demonstrated previously that PV(x∗) is a completely metrizable convex
subset of P(Y ). To see that T(x∗) is a Borel subset, note that it is a closed set intersected with
the complement of a Borel set (since B(x∗) is a Borel set).
Let h(·|α1,...,αn) = (h1(·|α1),h2(·|α2),...,hn(·|αn)) = (α1,...,αn), for α1,...,αn ∈
R|J| (in other words, each voter’s response function is a constant function on X). Let O(J) =
{α ∈ RJ :
P|J|
j=1 αj = 1} and denote by H the n(|J| − 1)-dimensional subset of C2 generated
by h:
H = {h(·|α1,...,αn) : αi ∈ O(J);∀i ∈ N}.
Let α = (α1,...,αn). It is clear that λH(PV(x∗)) > 0 since h(·|α) ∈ PV(x∗) for all α such
that α
j
i ≥ 0, for all i ∈ N and all j ∈ J.
Let h−1(x∗|a−1)−g−1(x∗) denote the vector of response functions (h2(·|a2)−g2,h3(·|a3)−
g3,...,hn(·|an)−g2), evaluated at x∗ and similarly for h−2(x∗|a−2)−g−2(x∗), h−3(x∗|a−3)−
g−3(x∗), and so forth. Fix g ∈ C2 and deﬁne
Ag(i,j,k) = {a ∈ (O(J))n :
δk
i (h−i(x∗|a−i) − g−i(x∗)) = δk
j(h−j(x∗|a−j) − g−j(x∗))}.
Ag(i,j,k) is the set of a ∈ (O(J))n such that
s + g = h(·|a)
for some s ∈ T(x∗). Accordingly, if λH(Ag(i,j,k)) = 0 for arbitrary g ∈ C2, i 6= j ∈ N, and
k ∈ J, it follows that T(x∗) is ﬁnitely shy in PV(x∗).
I now consider voters 1 and 2 and candidate 1 (without loss of generality) and derive voter
1’s pivot probability as a function of voter 2’s behavior (i.e., a2), holding the behavior of the
remaining voters (i.e., a3,...,an) constant.
14Or, the n/2 + 1th voter if n is even.
11Given g ∈ C2, suppose that s ∈ PV(x∗), with s = h(·|a) − g for some a ∈ O(J)n, and that





























i,l(j,q) is the probability that voter i is pivotal for candidate k, conditional on voter





















Note that voter 2’s pivot probability for candidate 1, δ1
2, is not a function of voter 2’s behavior,
h2−g2. By supposition, δ1
1(h−1(x∗|a−1)−g−1(x∗)) = δ1
2(h−2(x∗|a−2)−g−2(x∗)). Therefore,















1,2(j,h − g). (2)
holds for a subset of O(J) possessing Lebesgue measure zero.
There are two cases to consider. The ﬁrst case (Case I) is if there exists two candidates
j,k ∈ J such that K1
1,2(j,h − g) 6= K1
1,2(k,h − g). This case holds “most” of the time. The
second case (Case II) is when, for all pairs of candidates j,k ∈ J, we have that K1
1,2(j,h−g) =
K1
1,2(k,h − g). I deal with the cases in order. Since K1
1,2(j,h − g) is a function of a3,...,an,
these two cases correspond to different conﬁgurations of behavior by the remaining n − 2
voters.
Case I: There exist two candidates j,k ∈ J such that K1
1,2(j,h − g) 6= K1
1,2(k,h − g).
In this case, the set of a2 that satisfy Equation 2 possess dimension no greater than |J|−2,
which is strictly less than the dimensionality of O(J) (which is |J| − 1), implying that this
subset possesses Lebesgue measure zero in O(J). The Cartesian product of this subset and
O(J)n−1 lies within O(J)n. Since the subset deﬁned by Equation 2 has measure zero, Fubini’s
theorem [Halmos, (1974), Theorem A, p. 147], then implies the set of a ∈ Ag(1,2,1) such
that Case I holds, deﬁned as
Ag(1,2,1) = {a ∈ Ag(1,2,1) : ∃j,k ∈ J s.t. K
1




1,2(j,h − g) is conditional on the action of voter 2, the construction of Kk
i,l implicitly includes the
response functions of the n−2 voters other than 1 and 2 (i.e., a3,...,an). By holding Kk
i,l ﬁxed, we are supposing
that these n − 2 response functions are held ﬁxed. Below, we deﬁne versions of K that are conditioned on the
actions of more voters (i.e., voters 3, 4, and so on). The logic of those conditional probabilities is analogous to
that of K1
1,2(j,h − g).
12possesses Lebesgue measure zero in O(J)n.
Case II: For all pairs of candidates j,k ∈ J, K1
1,2(j,h − g) = K1
1,2(k,h − g) holds.
In this second case, voter 2’s behavior (i.e., a2) does not affect voter 1’s pivot probability
for candidate 1.16 Therefore, I now consider voter 3 and expand Equation 2 to include voter


























1,2,3(j,j3,h − g) is deﬁned in a manner analogous to K1
1,2(j,h − g), above: it is the
probability that voter 1 is pivotal for candidate 1, conditional on voter 2 voting for candidate
j, voter 3 voting for candidate j3, and the n-dimensional proﬁles of response functions h − g.




3,h − g) 6= K
1
1,2,3(k,j
3,h − g), (3)
then the set of a3 for which case (2) holds possesses Lebesgue measure zero in O(J). To see
this, ﬁrst note that
K1






















1,2,3(j,j3,h − g) − K1
1,2,3(k,j3,h − g)].
Then, supposing that K1
1,2,3(1,q,h−g) 6= K1
1,2,3(2,q,h−g) for some q ∈ J, K1
1,2(j,h−g)−
K1















1,2,3(1,q,h − g) − K1
1,2,3(2,q,h − g)] 6= 0, this implies that (holding a1,a2,a4,...,an
constant) the set of a3 that solves Equation 4 is of dimensionality no greater than |J| − 2. This
factplusFubini’stheoremimpliesthat, thesetofsolutionsinO(J)n toEquation4mustpossess
dimensionality no greater than n(|J| − 1) − 1, which implies that the Lebesgue measure (in
O(J)n, which is of dimensionality n(|J| − 1) of this set must be zero.
To ﬁnish this step of the proof, suppose that Equation 3 does not hold for any j,j3,k ∈ J.
The above argument for voter 3 can be applied iteratively, removing (i.e., conditioning upon
the actions of) additional voters one at a time and checking a condition analogous to Equation
3. Speciﬁcally, if we remove voters as ordered by their subscript,17 and are considering voter











l,h − g) (5)
16Similarly, voter 1’s behavior (i.e., a1) does not affect voter 2’s pivot probability for candidate 1.
17This choice of order is unnecessary, but convenient.
13for some jl−1,ˆ jl−1,jl ∈ J.18 If, at any voter l, Equation 5 holds, then the set of al such that
K1
1,2(j,h − g) = K1
1,2(k,h − g) for all j,k ∈ J possesses Lebesgue measure zero in O(J).
(The process of proving this involves an extended version of the argument derived following
Equation 4, above.)
Now let l = (n+3)/2 (or n/2+2 if n is even). In this case, it turns out that Equation 5 must
be satisﬁed. To see this, consider the case where n is odd19 and j = j3 = ... = jl−1 = jl = 1.
In this case, the probability of voter 1 being pivotal for candidate 1, conditional upon voters
2,3,...,(n + 3)/2 (i.e., a strict majority of the voters) voting for candidate 1 is 0, as voter 1’s
vote choice can not affect the outcome of the election. If, on the other hand, voter l votes for
(say) candidate 2 (i.e., jl = 2), then voter 1’s pivot probability for candidate 1 is positive by
the supposition that no voter’s response function assigns any candidate zero probability (i.e.,
h − g ∈ T(x∗) ⇒ h − g 6∈ B(x∗)).





κ > 0 if jl 6= 1
0 otherwise.
For our purposes, we do not need to know the exact value of κ (which may depend upon the
value of jl).20 Our sole interest in κ is that it is strictly greater than zero for any jl 6= 1.
I now claim that the set of al such that Equation 5 does not hold must possess Lebesgue





























(this step follows because K1




















l−1 = 1,h − g) − K
1
1,2,...,l−1(1,1,...,j





















18Note that the order of subscripts does not matter: one could, for example, phrase this condition as
K1
1,2,...,l(j,j3,...,jl−1,jl,h − g) 6= K1
1,2,...,l(j,ˆ j3,...,jl−1,jl,h − g) (6)
for some j3,ˆ j3,jl ∈ J. This is because the simple plurality rule considered here is anonymous.
19The case where n is even is analogous.
20It is easily derived though: the actual value of K1
j,j3,...,jl−1,1 for jl−1 6= 1 is 0.5 multiplied by the probability
of all n/2−1 remaining voters voting for jl−1 if n is even. If n is odd, then it is 0.5 multiplied by the probability
of all (n − 1)/2 remaining voters voting for some candidate other than jl−1 (including candidate 1). While these














l−1 = 1,h − g) = K
1
1,2,...,l−1(1,1,...,j


























and, since h − g 6∈ B(x∗), it follows that K1
1,2,...,l(1,2,...,2,jl) > 0 for all jl. Since a1
l is
determined uniquely in Equation 7, the set of al satisfying Equation 7 must possess Lebesgue
measure zero in O(J).21 Thus, the set of a1,...,an such that K1
1,2(j,h − g) = K1
1,2(k,h − g)
possesses Lebesgue measure zero in O(J)n.
Letting
Ag(1,2,1) = Ag(1,2,1) \ Ag(1,2,1),
denote the subset of A(1,2,1) in which Case II holds, it follows that Ag(1,2,1) possesses
Lebesgue measure zero in O(J)n, further implying (once again by Fubini’s theorem) that
Ag(1,2,1) possesses Lebesgue measure zero in O(J)n.
To conclude the proof, ﬁrst note that the Lebesgue measure of Ag(1,2,1) in O(J)n is less
than or equal to the sum of its Lebesgue measure in Cases I and II:
λH(Ag(1,2,1)) ≤ λH(Ag(1,2,1)) + λH(Ag(1,2,1)).
Thus, the Lebesgue measure of Ag(1,2,1) in O(J)n must be zero. Finally, note that the choice
of candidates and voters is arbitrary, thus proving the result for Ag(i,j,k), i,j ∈ N, and k ∈ J.
Hence, T(x∗) is ﬁnitely shy relative to PV(x∗), as was to be shown.
The ﬁnal lemma states that, given any point x∗ ∈ Int(Y ), the set of proﬁles of response
functions p ∈ (PV(x∗) \ (B(x∗) ∪ Z(x∗) ∪ T(x∗))) that simultaneously satisfy, for each can-
didate k ∈ J, the necessary ﬁrst and second order conditions for maximization of expected
vote share and the necessary ﬁrst order conditions for maximization of probability of victory
at x∗ is ﬁnitely shy with respect to the set of proﬁles of response functions that satisfy, for
each candidate k ∈ J, the necessary ﬁrst and second order conditions for expected vote share
maximization. This result is used to prove the paper’s main results, which state that the set
21The process described here, more generally, can be thought of as rewriting δ1
1(h−1(x∗|a−1) − g−1(x∗)) as
a function of a |J| × |J| × ... × |J| “hypermatrix.” Each voter reduces the dimensionality of this hypermatrix.
Hopefully the derivation in terms of sums makes the logic more transparent.
15of proﬁles of response functions which simultaneously satisfy the necessary ﬁrst and second
order conditions for maximization of both objective functions is ﬁnitely shy with respect to
the set of proﬁles that satisfy the ﬁrst and second order conditions under expected vote share
maximization.
Lemma 5 For any point x∗ ∈ Int(Y ), the set
R1(x





∗) = 0 ∀j ∈ J}
is ﬁnitely shy relative to PV(x∗).
Proof: That PV(x∗) is a completely metrizable convex subset of P(Y ) has been demonstrated
previously. It is easily veriﬁed that R1(x∗) is a Borel subset (it is the intersection of a Borel set
with a closed set).
Let f(·|α) : X × R → (−1/(2|J|),1/(2|J|)) be a twice continuously differentiable func-
tion with f(x∗
1) = 0 and Dxf(x∗
1) = 1..22 Deﬁne
hi(y|αi,βi) = (αif(x1) + βi,1/|J| − αif(x1) − βi,1/|J|,...,1/|J|)




and let H = {h(·|α,β) :
Pn
i=1 αi = 0,β ∈ Rn}. This is a 2n − 1 dimensional subspace of C2.
Note that, for any g ∈ C2, any voter i ∈ N, any candidate j ∈ J, and any β ∈ Rn, the











(where the subscript −i denotes the appropriate vector of functions for all j ∈ N\{i}). In other
words, a ﬁxed value of β “pins down” the voters’ pivot probabilities. Similarly, for any g ∈ C2,







so that a ﬁxed value of α pins down the gradients of voters’ behaviors.
Note that λH(PV(x∗)) > 0 since h(·|α,β) ∈ PV(x∗) if
Pn
i=1 αi = 0 and, for all i ∈ N,
βi ∈ (−1/(2kJ|),1/2|J|). It is now shown that λH(R1(x∗)+g) = 0 for any g ∈ C2. To prove
22The notation x∗
1 denotes candidate 1’s position in policy proﬁle x∗. The function f depends only on candidate
1’s policy position.
16this, it sufﬁces to show that, for arbitrary ﬁxed g ∈ C2 and for all β such that δ1
1(g−1(x∗) +
h−1(x∗|·,β)) 6= δ1
2(g−2(x∗) + h−2(x∗|·,β)),23 the set
Sg(β) = {α ∈ R
n : g + h(x
∗|α,β) ∈ R1(x
∗)}
possesses Lebesgue measure zero in Rn.
To see why this is sufﬁcient, ﬁx α,β and let s = g + h(·|α,β). Then note that s ∈ R1(x∗)
implies that there exists a distinct pair of voters i,k and a candidate j such that
Dxjsi(x
∗) > 0 > Dxjsk(x
∗).
Therefore, one can examine voters 1 and 2 and candidate 1 without loss of generality. Second,
note that s ∈ R1(x∗) implies that δ
j
i(s−i(x∗)) > 0 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ J. Finally, β such that
δ1
1(s−1(x∗)) = δ1
2(s−2(x∗)) implies that s ∈ T(x∗) and hence s 6∈ R1(x∗).







it follows that, letting K(α,β) = −
Pn
i=3 δi(s−i(x∗))[Dx1gi(x∗) + Dx1hi(x∗|αi,βi)]24,
δ1(s−1(x∗))[Dx1g1(x∗) + Dx1h1(x∗|α1,β1)]
+δ2(s−2(x∗))[Dx1g2(x∗) + Dx1h2(x∗|α2,β2)] = K(α,β).
Substituting for h1 and h2,
δ1(s−1(x
∗))[Dx1g1(x
∗) + α1] + δ2(s−2(x
∗))[Dx1g2(x
∗) + α2] = K(α,β).
A sufﬁcient condition for λH(R1(x∗) + g) = 0 is, for any ﬁxed α−2 = ˜ α−2, there exists a
unique value of α2 such that s,t ∈ R1(x∗), s = g + h(α2, ˜ α−2,β), and t + g = h(α0
2, ˜ α−2,β)
jointly imply that α2 = α0
2. In other words, a necessary condition for λH(R1(x∗) + g) > 0 is
that there exist some α−2, β such that
K(α,β) = δ1(s−1(x
∗))[Dx1g1(x




∗)) = K(α,β) − δ1(s−1(x
∗))[Dx1g1(x




K(α,β) − δ1(s−1(x∗))[Dx1g1(x∗) + α1] − δ2(s−2(x∗))[Dx1g2(x∗)]
δ2(s−2(x∗))
(8)
for more than one value of z. However, s ∈ R1(x∗) implies that δ2(s−2(x∗)) > 0, so that z
is uniquely determined by Equation 8. Since α−2 and β are arbitrary in Equation 8 (except
that β must, of course, be such that s 6∈ T(x∗)), it must be the case that λH(R1(x∗) + g) = 0
because the dimensionality of the set of solutions to Equation 8 must be no greater than 2n−2
(implying that its 2n − 1 dimensional Lebesgue measure is zero). Thus, R1(x∗) is ﬁnitely shy
relative to PV(x∗), as was to be shown.
23Recall that specifying the vector β is sufﬁcient to generate the the pivot probabilities for all voters i ∈ N and
all candidate j ∈ J, even with α left unspeciﬁed.
24Note that K(α,β) is constant with respect to α1 and α2.
17I now prove the following theorem, which states that a policy proﬁle x∗ that simultaneously
satisﬁes each candidate’s ﬁrst and second order conditions for maximization of expected vote
sharegenerically(intermsofthevoters’responsefunctions)doesnotdosoforeachcandidate’s
probability of victory as well.
Theorem 1 For any point x∗ ∈ Int(Y ), the set PV,R(x∗,J) is ﬁnitely shy in PV(x∗).
Proof: Note that PV,R(x∗,J) ⊂ R1(x∗) ∪ B(x∗) ∪ Z(x∗). By Lemma 2, B(x∗) is ﬁnitely shy
in PV(x∗). By Lemma 3, Z(x∗) is ﬁnitely shy in PV(x∗). By Lemma 5, R1(x∗) is ﬁnitely
shy in PV(x∗). Thus, PV,R(x∗,J) is the subset of a ﬁnite union of sets that are ﬁnitely shy in
PV(x∗,J) and hence ﬁnitely shy in PV(x∗,J) as well.
I now state the main result, which states that a policy proﬁle x∗ that satisﬁes the ﬁrst and
second order conditions for maximization of expected vote share for any candidate j gener-
ically does not do so for that candidate’s probability of victory. This result is stronger than
Theorem 1 in that the other candidates’ objectives are left arbitrary.
Before presenting the main result, deﬁne the following sets for all candidates j ∈ J and all
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∗) = 0 }
Note that, for any j ∈ J, the proofs of Lemmas 2, 3, 4, and 5 can be applied to prove that
Bj(x∗), Zj(x∗), T j(x∗), and R1j(x∗) are each ﬁnitely shy in P
j
V(x∗). Thus, the following
result is stated without proof, as it is a mirror of the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 For any j ∈ J, x∗ ∈ Int(Y ), P
j
V,R(x∗) is ﬁnitely shy with respect to P
j
V(x∗).
Theorem 2 states that, when considering an arbitrary proﬁle of response functions and a
vector of opponents’ policies under which an interior policy x∗ satisﬁes the necessary condi-
tions for maximization of candidate j’s expected vote share, it is generally not the case that
the ﬁrst and second order conditions for maximization of the candidate’s probability of vic-
tory will be satisﬁed at x∗ as well. One conclusion to be drawn is that, in general, the best
25It might be useful to note that PV (x∗) = ∩j∈JP
j





V,R(x∗), B(x∗) = ∩j∈JBj(x∗), Z(x∗) = ∩j∈JZj(x∗), T(x∗) = ∩j∈JTj(x∗), and R1(x∗) =
∩j∈JR1j(x∗).
18response correspondences generated by maximization of probability of victory and maximiza-
tion of expected vote share maximization will differ. A second conclusion to be drawn is that
the genericity found in Theorem 1 does not depend on the assumption that all candidates share
the same objective. In other words, regardless of what the other candidates choose, platforms
satisfying the ﬁrst and second order conditions for maximization of one objective generically
do not satisfy the ﬁrst and second order conditions for the other. Thus, the results do not depend
on the assumption that the candidates all share the same objective function.
6 Conclusions
In this paper I have shown that satisfaction of the ﬁrst and second order conditions for maxi-
mization of a candidate’s expected vote share generically implies the violation of the ﬁrst and
second order conditions for maximization of that candidate’s probability of victory. Making
the point another way, the results presented in this paper demonstrate that the predictions of
game theoretic models of electoral competition with probabilistic voters will almost always
depend upon the assumed functional form of politicians’ objectives. Furthermore, this is true
for two commonly used versions of “ofﬁce motivation.”
The paper’s results hold for any policy on the interior of the policy space as long as voters’
behaviors are only restricted to be twice continuously differentiable functions of the policy
proﬁle chosen by the candidates. An important implication of this result is that best response
equivalence between these two objectives is “almost never” satisﬁed. This result is in accor-
dance with the tenor of the results of Aranson, Hinich, and Ordeshook (1974), which also
show that equivalence between maximization of vote share and maximization of probability of
victory is a rare event, though in a different framework.
The importance of these results lies in the research topics which remain open due to the
frequent failure of equivalence to hold. In particular, what are the properties of electoral com-
petition under different objective functions? Are equilibrium outcomes under one objective
function more representative than under another? What is the relative “punishment” (in terms
of decreased chances of victory) of candidates who seek to maximize vote share under different
electoral rules?
There are several questions regarding candidates objective functions which remain open.
Perhaps the most relevant of these questions is what are the effects of different electoral in-
stitutions on equivalence between candidate objective functions? For example, we have not
examined the properties of proportional representation, multiple winners, multiple ballot sys-
tems (e.g., simple majority rule systems with runoffs or party based systems with primaries),
or different scoring rules such as approval voting and the Borda count.
More immediate extensions of the model include the following. It may be of interest to
restrict attention to voter response functions which are symmetric. If voter i possesses a sym-
metric response, then if 2 or more candidates choose the same policy, voter i votes for each
such candidate with equal probability (this is a property of logit and probit response functions
19in a world of policy-motivated voters, for example).26 Also, I do not examine at least one other
plausible objective function: maximization of expected margin of victory. Aranson, Hinich,
and Ordeshook (1974), Hinich (1977), Ledyard (1984), and Patty (2001) each examine this
objective function, but primarily in the context of 2 candidate contests. Finally, the question of
abstention has not been dealt with in this paper. It is conjectured that allowing for abstention
will only strengthen the tenor of the results obtained in this paper.27
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 For any electoral game with differentiable response functions p, any candidate j ∈








































































































































For any voter i ∈ N and any vector of policy proposals x ∈ Y ,
PJ
l=1 pl
i(x) = 1, so that,
21for any candidate j ∈ J,
PJ
l=1 Djpl






















































For any voter i, any candidate j, and any vote vector a ∈ A, ai 6= j implies that a 6∈ D(i;j).









































For any voter i ∈ N and candidate j ∈ J, let ND(i;j) ⊂ A−i denote the set of vectors of
votes other than i’s in which j ∈ W(A) and i can not be pivotal for j. That is, regardless of i’s
vote, W(a) remains the same (and includes j). Formally,



































































































Finally, using Equation 1 and substituting δl









as was to be shown.
23